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Abstract
Nowadays many companies understand the beneﬁt of outsourcing. Yet, in current outsourcing practices,
clients usually focus primarily on business objectives and security is negotiated only for communication
links. It is however not determined how data must be protected after transmission. Strong protection
of a communication link is of little value if data can be easily stolen or corrupted while on a supplier’s
server. The problem raises a number of related challenges such as: identiﬁcation of metrics which are more
suitable for security-level negotiation, client and contractor perspective and security guarantees in service
composition scenarios. These challenges and some others are discussed in depth in the article.
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1 Introduction
Today many companies prefer to delegate IT work packages to external or third-
party organizations rather than fulﬁlling them themselves [4,11]. In this way a
company can concentrate on its core business rather than on peripheral tasks, espe-
cially if they diﬀer too much from the company’s primary activities. For example,
Consolidated Freightways, a transportation company, outsources the upgrade and
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Deﬁnition 1.1 Outsourcing is the ongoing administration, management and possi-
bly subcontracting by an external party, of speciﬁc client’s (IT) processes to enhance
their eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness [25]
Often the outsourced company itself may further outsource its assignments to
others. That is, a company may start as a contractor and by acquiring and handing
out new assignments may become an orchestrator.
When a company plays an orchestration role it coordinates a business process
to accomplish the work. The process can be static or dynamic. In traditional
outsourcing contracts we envisage a static orchestration where the process is deﬁned
from the outset and partners and services do not change. For novel paradigms, such
as virtual organizations, partners and services can be selected on the ﬂy.
Before cooperation proceeds, participants negotiate a Service Level Agreement
(SLA). The main part of the agreement is devoted to functional requirements and
to some non-functional requirements such as performance. Not enough attention,
if any, is devoted to security.
Example 1.2 Web Service security only focuses on the security parameters of com-
munication links. It covers requirements for message encryption, signature, authen-
tication, and server access control [2,23]. WS security standards do not mention
how data is protected after transmission. Data can therefore be stored in a server
without a properly conﬁgured antivirus or in a database without role base access
control.
In this paper we identify the security and trust issues that underpin an out-
sourcing relationship and the notion of Protection Level Agreement (PLA) that is
appropriate in this setting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a short state of the art in security
metrics. We introduce a notion of PLA in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to
client’s and contractor’s view of PLA respectively. Section 6 describes how client’s
PLA can be achieved in service composition scenario. The issue that trust is not
transitive is discussed in Section 7. Section 8 is dedicated to related works.
2 Security Metrics. A Primer
Unclear performance and benchmarking metrics are a cause of 56% of outsourcing
relationship failure [31]. Therefore, the ﬁrst step in the problem solution is security
metrics identiﬁcation, a task that so far remained elusive.
Loosely speaking all metrics can be classiﬁed into one or more of the following
categories:
Organizational - evaluate the security management process.
Operational - assess the system and operating principles in place
Technical - evaluates the quality of software and hardware.
The most well known technical method are the Common Criteria [15]. A product
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is evaluated against a Protection Proﬁle , a set of requirements for the corresponding
product category. Evaluation Assurance Levels (from EAL0 to EAL7) show the level
of satisfaction w.r.t. a Protection Proﬁle.
SSE-CMM (System Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model) [27] eval-
uates a security management process. SSE-CMM assigns a level of maturity (from
1 to 5) to a security system engineering process. This appraisal denotes how well
the organization fulﬁls all base practices.
These methods give a numerical (discrete) measures of security of management
processes and products quality. There is no such evaluation method for operational
security. Common Criteria can be used for this purpose, but ”the interaction be-
tween variety of products (hardware and software) are such that detailed evaluation
is very close to practical impossible” [19].
Some guidelines [29,8] suggest checking how well (percentage of compliance) the
system fulﬁls best practices. The list of the best practices can be huge and it is
very diﬃcult to prove that it is complete, even if a well known standard (such as
ISO17799) is used as a basis [10,16].
Risk analysis [28,1,6] is one of the prominent of security system assessment
approaches. The most used metric for this analysis is annual monetary loss. If
other dimensions (e.g. hours of downtime, reputation) are also used the losses
of an organization can not be measured in currency. In this case some form of
normalization must be used [6].
Several approaches tried to calculate metrics based on mean-time-to-security-
failure [21,24]. Most of them are based on threat analysis of an attack graph. This
metric is theoretically useful but so far a ﬁeld test for its practical relevance is
missing.
3 Security Issues in IT Outsourcing
Before proceeding, we identify the stake-holder entities in a typical outsourcing
scenario. These entities are sketched in Figure 1.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A Client is an entity that interacts with of a completed, self-
contained business process. A Contractor is an entity which agrees to execute the
business process and satisfy the client’s requirements for such execution. An Orches-
trator is a contractor that manages a workﬂow, where some tasks are distributed to
other entities. A Subcontractor is an entity that receives a task assignment, which
is part of a higher-level business process, from another contractor.
In the Figure 1 the contractor plays an orchestrator role, suggesting that an
orchestrator always plays a client role with subcontractors. Before investigating
technology solutions, such as trusted computing platforms or multi-party computa-
tions, we consider what assumptions can be made about the nature of the business
agreements and trust between the parties involved. A ”contractual trust” relation-
ship between client and contractor exists, in that they have agreed on binding terms
and conditions in a Service Level Agreement (SLA).The contractor is hence trusted
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Fig. 1. General business outsourcing scheme of functional interaction
because if it does not behave according to the contract it is obliged to pay penalties
to the client.
The agreement between a contractor and a client normally contains guarantees
that reﬂect the client’s business objectives, devoted to functional requirements.
These objectives determine the Quality of Service (QoS) which the contractor’s
system must portray.
The high level security goal of a client is to protect its data and make it available
(always and only) to the entitled users. In the outsourcing scenario, a client shifts
data processing to a contractor and, in doing so, relinquishes direct control of the
way in which data is processed and protected. Hence, we return to our key problem:
deﬁning the security equivalent notion of QoS and SLA.
The contract must clearly describe how data is protected while under the con-
tractor’s control:
• protection in transmission is the protection of client’s data while in transit from
the client’s host to the contractor’s internal network.
• protection in processing is the protection of client’s data when a contractor con-
trols the way in which data is processed. That is, when stored on machines within
the contractor’s administrative domain.
Existing forms built around Web Services technology deﬁne means for specifying
the parameters for a secure communications link. These include requirements for
message encryption, signature, authentication and server access control [2,23].
Agreements about data processing and storage restrictions are absent in the Web
Service contract. With this missing part, strong communications link only solves
one dimension of the secure outsourcing problem (see example 1.2).
Proposal 1 A client and a contractor must negotiate a data protection agreement
including warrants that data is protected during processing by a contractor, as well
as during its transmission. These warrants describe the Quality of Protection (QoP)
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required for outsourcing system.
Challenge 1 How do we guarantee that a certain QoP is achieved?
We need some metrics to be sure that the promised level is achieved. Traditional
SLA metrics measure some aspects of the process and represent the Quality of
Service towards meeting the business objectives. The identiﬁcation of the metrics is
a core phase for agreement negotiation. The client must be sure that its objectives
are completely reﬂected and chosen metrics are relevant for it. The Quality of
Protection should be represented by metrics as well.
Proposal 2 Protection Level Agreement (PLA) is proposed as the section of an
agreement that contains security requirements.
Challenge 2 Which metrics are more appropriate for PLA?
Solving Challenges 1 and 2 poses several issues:
(i) Client vs. Contractor. This is the client’s view of the problem. It has to deﬁne
which metrics and PLA satisfy its security business objectives. Another main
issue is the monitoring of the actual protection mechanism to check whether
PLA are actually met and not only declared.
(ii) Contractor vs. Client. It is the contractor’s perspective. The contractor must
determine the metric targets it can provide and how such metrics are related
to achievement of the metrics negotiated with its client.
(iii) Contractor vs. subcontractors. Other issues arise if service composition takes
place. The orchestrator must compose the PLAs of its subcontractors to meet
the client’s PLA.
(iv) Intransibility of Trust. A client may trust to a contractor but not trust its
subcontractors. This point must be taken into an account by an orchestrator
when a business process is created or a certain QoP is negotiated.
4 Client vs. Contractor
The following observation on the diﬀerence between SLA and PLA is useful to decide
the appropriate representation for security requirements. SLA describes functional
requirements: what the system must at-least do. On the other hand, the natural
intuition behind a PLA is that it describes negative events and speciﬁes things that
the system should at-most allow. This point is represented in Figure 2.
Example 4.1 For example, the speed of connection must be not less then 256
bits/s. Nobody will complain if the speed is higher. On the other hand, the number
of successful virus attacks must not be higher then 10 per month (nobody will
complain if the number of successful attacks is less).
Proposal 3 A PLA represents ”at-most” allow requirements on the behavior of the
outsourcing system
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Fig. 2. Acceptable system behavior .
We want to highlight that if a primary goal of outsourcing is a functional service
it is more convenient for a client to determine its security requirements as a PLA. In
other words, the client should set a SLA to guarantee that it receives an appropriate
level of QoS on its functional service and should accompany this agreement by
setting also a PLA to guarantee that the data that it provides for the Functional
service get an adequate level of QoP.
In contrast, if the primary goal of outsourcing is to shift security services then
a SLA should be speciﬁed on those activities. Indeed in this case, the functional
service that we are outsourcing is simply a service whose particular function is a
security function. So we should be able to distinguish when security is the service
itself (SLA needed) from the case in which security protects the object of the service
(PLA needed). Indeed, the processing of the data which is used to deliver the
security services should be subject to a PLA.
An example might clarify better the point: if we are outsourcing a key generation
function for identity-based cryptography we should set up a SLA on the minimum
key size (i.e. SLA on the function). In contrast a PLA should be set up to protect
our identities or our private key (i.e. PLA on the data for and from the function).
The crucial point in PLA negotiation is identiﬁcation of metrics which describe
the level of protection. We have identiﬁed two types of metrics:
Deﬁnition 4.2 Internal metrics describe security qualities used by a contractor to
achieve a high level of security.
Internal metrics help a contractor estimate the maturity of its security system.
Some examples of these metrics are: time between updates [18], length of passwords,
percentage of compliance with a standard [10,16]. Of course, there is monitoring and
enforcing on the metrics. How can we know that updates are done weekly? On the
one hand, this information can be taken from logs. On the other one, the contractor
does not want to show the sensitive information, which can compromise its security
system and other clients whose data is stored in the logs as well. Moreover, the
contractor has full control on the log system and can easily change the data. This
is one of the reasons why we believe that internal metrics are unsuitable.
Deﬁnition 4.3 External metrics are negotiated with the client to show that its
security requirements are addressed.
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External metrics are understandable for a client and show how security solutions
aﬀect it. Possible examples are number of successful attacks on client’s data conﬁ-
dentiality [6], mean time to intrusion aﬀecting client’s data [24,21], time for system
recovering after an undesirable event to restore the availability of client’s data.
Mark Lutchen in [20] notes, ’What other mistakes are companies making? When
they do outsource IT, they frequently use the wrong metrics - metrics focused on
processes, not outcomes...’.
Internal metrics are not informative enough for a client, beside being diﬃcult to
monitor and enforce.
Example 4.4 A client may specify an external metric: at most 2 successful virus
attacks every month; or an internal one: the antivirus system must be updated at
least every 2 weeks, knowing that according to the statistical evidence the number
of new virus attacks is expected to be similar. If the trend changes (i.e. wild
viruses per month increase) more viruses will aﬀect the client’s data than before
even if the contractor behaves according to the agreement. In the ﬁrst case, it is the
contractor’s responsibility to cope with the problem (i.e. update antivirus system
once a week) to keep the number of virus attacks as it is speciﬁed in the agreement.
Proposal 4 External metrics should be used in PLA negotiations.
So which external metrics are most fruitful for a QoP? We do not recommend
metrics based on risk analysis and ﬁnancial results. At ﬁrst these metrics have a
number of limitations and are not precise [9]. Further, qualitative analysis ampliﬁes
these limitations because it operates with relative values (e.g. high, medium, low).
The second and foremost reason is that these values are not connected to the service
provided and cannot be monitored by the contractor and the client in a shared and
agreed way (loss expectancy is diﬃcult to estimate). This does not mean that clients
should not use risk analysis to identify the appropriate PLA but simply that the
outcomes of the risk analysis such as Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE) themselves
should not be a PLA.
Here we propose the following metrics:
Undesirable events in the observed interval. This measure can be either a per-
centage or in an absolute value.
Free interval - the interval between the moment in which an undesirable event
took place and the moment in which the incident was tracked and recognized as
such.
Time of recovery - the interval between the moment in which the incident has
been tracked and the time in which it has been ﬁxed.
We want to point to one more additional problem of trust which is beyond the
identiﬁcation of correct metrics: their monitoring, because in fact they may not be
fulﬁlled by a contractor.
Challenge 3 How can a client monitor requirement fulﬁlment?
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A monitor system which controls PLA fulﬁlments should be developed. Many
requirements are very diﬃcult to check by external audit, i.e. from the client’s
environment. So this monitor should be installed in the untrustable contractor’s
network where the contractor has physical access to it. Several techniques can be
used to assure the client that it can trust to the received data: using cryptographic
primitives [3], deploying a Trusted Computer Group’s environment [26], involving
a Trusted Third Party .
5 Contractor vs. Client
A PLA does not tell the contractor how it should conﬁgure its system to meet the
requirements. The contractor must map the PLA to a functional SLA, to receive
concrete requirements which deﬁnes what the contractor should install and how it
should behave. The mapping may be based on industry statistical data trends,
personal experience, stored history, etc. If a client has some particular security
requirements or security is one of the main goals of outsourcing the requirements
can be expressed in ”at-least” way (SLA) directly.
To achieve the external metrics the contractor will have to put in place a num-
ber of security policies and mechanisms. This eventually means that a PLA will be
transformed to a SLA from ”at most one e-mail attachment virus per week steps
through the company’s centralized antivirus software” to ”at-least one signature
update per day to the centralized antivirus software”. Once such transformation
has been done we can use internal security metrics to evaluate the quality of pro-
tection achieved, represented by external metrics. A discussion of the idea can be
found in [18]. But this idea has not been substantiated by experimental evidences,
statistical studies, or formal reasoning. It is just an author’s opinion. The author
himself has pointed that it is diﬃcult to take into account all factors (e.g. events are
not independent, many countermeasures contribute somehow to overall reduction
of event probability and so on).
Challenge 4 How to correlate internal metrics to external metrics?
Indeed, methods which estimate a security level are based on a set of questions to
check compliance with standards [14]. The set is broken up into protection domains
(cryptography, audit, networking). The questionnaire can be redivided into threat
domains (protection against viruses, password sniﬃng, DoS). After that we receive
a complete set of parameters and corresponding internal metrics which contribute
to a threat protection. Now if we can tell how each of the techniques contributes
to mitigation of the threat (e.g presence of a ﬁrewall reduces the number of Trojan
Horses by 30 percents) correct internal parameters can be chosen to achieve external
metrics (e.g. number of Trojan Horses per month).
6 Contractor vs. Subcontractor
In most cases the contractor has to execute a business process (a workﬂow) to satisfy
the client’s needs. The workﬂow can be speciﬁed by a client or by a contractor. At
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one extreme, the client can specify a workﬂow and require that the contractor
fulﬁls it as it is. On the other hand, the client can only deﬁne a set of high level
requirements. In this case the contractor has to create the workﬂow itself in such a
way as to fulﬁl all client’s requirements.
Sometimes a contractor does not fulﬁl all workﬂow tasks itself but sends a part
or several parts of the task to subcontractors which have various levels of protection
(Figure 1).
Challenge 5 How can the orchestrator assign outsourced tasks and PLAs to sub-
contractors to create a business process which not just accomplishes the client’s SLA
but satisﬁes the client’s PLA as well?
At the beginning the contractor has to identify how each subcontractor’s PLAi
contributes to the client’s PLA. It depends on the functional workﬂow and how
undesirable events at the workﬂow level as a whole map into sub events.
The process can be made once before the execution: the contractor determines
the entire process and then just follows it. In more dynamic environment, the
contractor can make a decision during the process execution. This helps establishing
the process to fulﬁl clients requirements in the most eﬃcient way.
7 Trust is not transitive
When several participants come to play, trust issues emerge. As we said a client
trusts a contractor to accomplish the task, because their relationship is sealed by a
contract. At the same time a contractor trusts its subcontractors for the very same
reasons. However there is no contractual trust between a client and the subcon-
tractors. If a subcontractor misbehave the client will have to get back to the main
contractor and for a variety of reasons he might decide not to get a proper com-
pensation. The same is true for the contractor – subcontractor relationship. Hence
there is the need to consider more ”subjective” notion of trust instead of contractual
trust. The client may trust some subcontractors more than others. This decision
may be based on previous experience or on statistics. Since the data is not under
client’s control after its transmission to the contractor, trust relationships must be
speciﬁed beforehand. The challenge which arises is:
Challenge 6 How can a client determine which subcontractors it trusts more than
others and which less than others?
One of the possible solutions can be taken from [22]. An orchestrator suggests
several possible subcontractors for the business process. The client determines a
level of trust (e.g. from 1 to 10) for each of them. A reasoning algorithm, similar to
the one represented in [22], returns the most trustable set of subcontractors which
can be used by the orchestrator to accomplish the client’s goal.
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8 Related works
Only a few works tackle the issue of security requirements in business outsourcing.
In [17] it is claimed that security requirements must be reﬂected in the contract and
their fulﬁlment must be somehow monitored. The authors consider security require-
ments as a part of SLA. Trusted Virtual Domains (TVDs) [12,5] are intended to
connect a number of remote trustable virtual processing environments in one secure
network. Security operational policy (accord of PLA/SLA), which are obligatory
for every environment, are used. This technology can be applied to client-contractor
interaction when one side (most likely, a contractor) allows another one to use its
TVD. It is necessary to point to that TVD requires installation of special isolating
software to operate.
In [26] a monitoring system for trusted computer platform is presented. The
idea is to embed a trusted hardware component into the execution environment
which veriﬁes the compliance of the system with an operational policy (which can
be considered as a PLA) at the beginning of interaction.
One of the ﬁrst papers discussing security SLA in a large enterprise is [13]. The
main idea is to check compliance the system with ﬁfteen security domains split
into best practices. For each best practice the security service level is determined
and added to the SLA (yet it does not consider task outsourcing). [7] extends the
security division to compare two SLAs or to ﬁnd a security SLA which is the closest
to the desired one. A similar idea of divide-and-conquer technique was applied to
evaluation of Web Service security in [30].
9 Conclusion
In the article the problem of guaranteeing appropriate security during storing data
on a contractor’s server has been discussed in depth. We have introduced several
important deﬁnitions and identiﬁed a number of challenges and issues.
We have argued that external metrics are more meaningful for a client and have
proposed some of them which can be used for PLA. Internal metrics are more appro-
priate for a contractor. They help to estimate the quality of its security system and
to choose the right conﬁguration to achieve its client’s requirements. Monitoring of
security requirement fulﬁlment is another important issue which depends on metric
types. External metrics can be monitored by a client remotely. For monitoring of
internal metrics special techniques should be applied to guarantee that the data
may be trusted. We have pointed some of the techniques, but how to apply them
is another big issue.
Additional issues emerge in a service composition scenario. Clients’s security
requirements must be inserted into a functional workﬂow, decomposed and dis-
tributed between subcontractors. In addition to these issues trust relationships
must be taken into account.
In this article we have focused more on technical side of the agreement. One
problem that we have left out is the issue of enforcement. The issue must be
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considered before applying PLA as a contract, but we left it for a future work.
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